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1. Introduction∗ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The outcome of the disputed presidential elections in Ukraine is still highly uncertain. It is 
however clear that the Orange Revolution of November 2004 will have profound consequences 
for Europe and the European Union's relationship with Ukraine. Since the second round of 
presidential elections on 21 November, the Ukrainian people have shown the strength of their 
desire for Ukraine to be a pluralistic democracy. It is therefore essential that Europe responds 
with equal determination to support the aspirations of the Ukrainian people. 
 
It is now abundantly clear that the elections were falsified by the Ukrainian authorities. This view 
is now endorsed by a number of bodies ranging from the Ukrainian parliament, to the EU, EU 
member states, the OSCE and the US, all of which have refused to recognise Victor Yanukovych 
as the president of Ukraine. In contrast, Russia has done so. 
 
However, the next stage in the ensuing turmoil in Ukraine is unclear, as from a legal point of 
view, Ukraine has fallen into a political vacuum. It is clear that the struggle between the 
Ukrainian authorities and the opposition is not over. 
 
Owing to proclamations made by senior political figures in the eastern and southern regions of 
Ukraine for regional autonomy, the spectre of secession has arisen in Ukraine, with its potential 
disintegration into what observers (in the EU and US) have referred to as a 'West and East'. It 
needs to be emphasized that this is an oversimplification. The issue of separation is limited to 
the south-eastern regions of Ukraine, namely Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where Mr 
Yanukovych has his power base. With a combined population of more than 7 million, or 15% of 
Ukraine’s total population, these two regions contain much of Ukraine’s natural resources. They 
are also the home to important industries such as in steel and mining that have played a crucial 
role in the recent economic upturn in Ukraine. However, while these moves towards greater 
regional autonomy are significant, as things stand the likelihood of them leading to secession is 
exaggerated. The disintegration of Ukraine is improbable. 
                                                 
∗ This article is also available on the websites of the Centre for European Policy Studies as CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 60/December 2004 (www.ceps.be), the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign 
Policy of Ukraine as Policy Brief No. 17/2004 (www. foreignpolicy.org.ua) and on the website of 
the Stefan Batory Foundation (www.batory.org).  
The text was completed on December 2, 2004  
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A victory for the opposition in any subsequent rounds is a likely outcome, although far from 
certain; a victory for the current authorities is still possible. Either way, the EU will need to 
develop a clear strategy on Ukraine for immediate future and after that, the next months and 
years. 
 
Three strategies are needed: 
 
• First, the EU needs to develop strategies to support the democratic transmission of 
power from president Kuchma to his successor (immediate strategy), 
• Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal with the consequences of a 
Yanukovych victory (or that of any other person representing the current authorities) 
(medium term strategy), 
• Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the event of a Yushchenko presidency 
(medium and long term strategy). 
 
  
Strategy 1: Support for the democratic transmission of power from 
president Kuchma to a successor 
 
The EU's declaration issued by the Dutch EU Presidency on Monday 22 November was 
appropriate, and rather strong by EU standards. The declaration stated that the EU would 
discuss, "without delay", possible "further steps" with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. Also the 
Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Ukraine from 24 November 2004 was a 
step in right direction in that the EU did not acknowledge the final results announced by 
Ukraine’s Central Election Committee. 
 
The EU should now spell out these “further steps”. The EU should first of all make it clear that, in 
the event of violence being instigated by the authorities, it will immediately suspend all contacts 
with the Ukrainian leadership. A travel ban on those leaders, like the one recently imposed on 
the Belarusian leadership, should be instituted and any assets held in Western banks by those 
involved should be frozen. 
 
At the same time the EU needs to make it clear that the political crisis should be resolved as 
soon as possible and that stalling tactics on the part of Ukrainian authorities are not acceptable. 
The matter needs to be resolved in weeks not months. The mediation efforts by EU foreign 
policy chief Solana, Polish President Kwasniewski and Lithuanian President Adamkus has been a 
welcome example of EU engagement in the crisis. The EU needs to express its willingness to 
mediate in the event of a deterioration of the situation in Ukraine. 
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If the review of the election process and its results by the Rada and Supreme Court finds 
evidence of fraud such that the result cannot be determined or said to reflect the will of the 
Ukrainian people, new elections run by the OSCE should be considered (the OSCE has run 
elections in Bosnia and could do so in Ukraine). The EU and the international community more 
broadly should show its willingness to participate and support these new elections, if it is 
decided that they are to take place. 
 
The EU should keep Russia informed as to its opinion on Ukraine. The discussions between the 
prime minister of the Netherlands, Mr Jan Peter Balkenende, and the president of Russia, Mr 
Vladimir Putin during the EU-Russia summit in The Hague was a good beginning. The EU should 
continue to make co-operation in Ukraine and other areas of the "common neighbourhood" a 
condition for further co-operation on international security issues. 
 
The EU's efforts to promote a democratic, peaceful solution of the political crisis in Ukraine 
should be co-ordinated with the US and Canada. A meeting of high-level officials from both sides 
should be considered. These effort needs to be intensified also through bilateral contacts and in 
international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and NATO. 
 
 
Strategy 2: Reactions to a Yanukovych presidency 
 
It is imperative that in the event of a Yanukovych victory (or another representative of the 
current regime) in any subsequent elections, the EU resists the temptation to disengage with 
Ukraine, as occurred in the case of Belarus when Lukashenko usurped power. Arguably it is 
precisely the lack of EU engagement with Ukraine which may have contributed to the current 
situation in Ukraine. A more appropriate model is Yugoslavia in 2000, where Europe and the 
international community provided crucial support and encouragement to the democratic forces 
in the country, leading to the fall of Mr Milosevic’s regime by peaceful democratic means. 
 
In the event that Mr Yanukovych is acknowledged as the winner, the EU will need to radically 
change its policy. Economic aid to Ukraine should be re-targeted, away from technical assistance 
for the approximation of economic legislation to the EU acquis, investment support for 
infrastructure networks, etc. Instead, the EU should offer strong and immediate 'political 
assistance' to support a pluralistic democratic Ukraine, with increased and direct support for 
political parties, civil society, free media, etc. The EU could learn from the US in this respect. 
Indeed, the EU has been conspicuous by its absence in Ukraine. 
 
Any political dialogue with the executive power should be suspended or minimised until either 
a) new presidential elections or, in the event that these were not to take place b) parliamentary 
elections in spring 2006. After either of those, the situation in Ukraine should be reviewed. In 
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addition, the EU should co-operate closely with the Ukrainian parliament where the Ukrainian 
opposition is strong.  
 
Strategy 3: Special strategy for Ukraine under Yushchenko presidency 
 
A Yushchenko victory would pose a profound challenge for Europe and the EU. Indeed, on one 
level the EU may find it more difficult to deal with a Ukraine under President Yushchenko than a 
Ukraine led by a President Yanukovych. There are two reasons for this. First, Viktor Yuschenko is 
serious about domestic reform. Secondly, he is committed to Ukraine’s eventual membership of 
the EU. 
 
In contrast to Mr Kuchma, who also was ostensibly in favour of eventual accession to the EU, 
under Mr Yushchenko a push towards EU membership will become credible, as it is likely to be 
accompanied by economic and political reform. As Prime Minister in 1999-2001, Mr Yushchenko 
pushed vigorously for economic reforms. Indeed, the threat such reforms posed to powerful 
oligarchs closely associated with President Kuchma was the reason he was dismissed. While 
there are vested interests against serious reform in Ukraine, a President Yushchenko would be 
supported by what appears to be a comfortable majority in the Ukrainian parliament. Crucially, 
judging by the ongoing mass demonstrations, he enjoys strong popular support, making 
implementation of difficult reforms more likely. 
 
His immediate task would be to gain the trust and support of the large number of voters in the 
east and south who voted for Yanukovych. Populist measures to improve the situation of the 
masses can be expected. These can be afforded due to current strong economic growth in 
Ukraine. Indeed, not reversing the increase in pensions and student grants introduced by Prime 
Minister Yanukovych in his bid for the presidency, may be a wise strategy. Re-launching the 
privatisation process halted by President Kuchma before the elections could further bolster state 
finances until the effects of expected economic reforms take effect. 
 
Economic and political reforms are likely to be accompanied by vigorous lobbying by the new 
President and his government for immediate measures from EU. In particular, the recently 
negotiated Action Plan to strengthen bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine as part of 
the EU’s new European Neighbourhood Policy is unlikely to be acceptable to a President 
Yushchenko. (It was originally planned that the Action Plan would be endorsed in early 
December. However, it is self-evident that the EU should not sign the Action Plan before the end 
of political crisis in Ukraine.) The Action Plan consists of long lists of political criteria that 
Ukraine would have to fulfill as well as specific measures to implement the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA). Apart from minor new commitments in the short-term and vague 
promises for closer relations in the medium-term, the Action Plan offers no specific 
commitments from the EU that would noticeably strengthen relations with Ukraine. 
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A new Action Plan should thus be negotiated as soon as the situation in Ukraine is clear and a 
new Ukrainian government is in place, as tangible proof of Europe's commitment to a 
democratic, pluralistic Ukraine. This should include a number of immediate measures such as 
the EU endowing Ukraine market-economy status for anti-dumping purposes, as the EU did with 
Russia in 2002, removing quantitative restrictions on steel imports from Ukraine, and starting 
negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement. The EU should also be more generous in terms of 
Ukraine's participation and inclusion in EU programmes and agencies. 
 
The EU should also live up to its promise of increasing economic assistance to Ukraine. The 
Union could take the lead in organising a donor conference, as was done for Georgia following 
its ‘Rose Revolution’ in late 2003, for a combined effort by the international community to 
support Ukraine. The EU and its member countries, the US, Canada, Japan, and the international 
financial institutions should take part in the conference. These efforts should be bolstered by 
common EU-US actions supporting Ukraine or at least some form of coordination of activities. 
The special role of Canada in trans-Atlantic actions towards Ukraine would be welcomed. 
 
A President Yushchenko is however unlikely to settle for an upgraded Action Plan. His stated 
long-term goal is EU membership for Ukraine. Faced with a pro-European reformist like 
President Yushchenko, bolstered by broad parliamentary and popular support, the EU will find it 
difficult to continue with its current policy of ‘welcoming Ukraine’s European aspirations’ 
without acknowledging Ukraine as a candidate. 
 
Coming on the eve of the European Council on December 16-17, the Orange Revolution poses a 
fundamental challenge for the EU. Widely expected to endorse the beginning of accession 
negotiations with Turkey, European leaders now have to confront with utmost seriousness the 
demand from Ukraine of being acknowledged as a candidate for EU membership. 
 
The EU finds itself a victim of its own rules, more specifically the Treaty article stating that any 
European country may become a member and the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for membership. Faced 
with a European country that fulfills these criteria, there is precious little the EU in the end can 
do. 
 
The abrogation of one of the fundamental tenets of European integration - that the Union is 
open to all European countries that fulfill the stated criteria of membership - would represent a 
fundamental break with the basic values on which the EU is based. To do this for the sake of 
political convenience - to avoid a complicated decision-making process - would be a dramatic 
break with more than 50 years of European history and a break with Europe's proudest 
achievements. It would also be a betrayal of the people of Ukraine who have taken to the streets 
to defend their democratic rights. This is the principal challenge posed to Europe by the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine. 
 
